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Abstract: Conflict analysis is used to evaluate the potential options players could be 
expected to use to settle disputes. When compromise is not possible, the options for 
settling disputes become limited. The Battle of Stalingrad is studied using basic conflict 
analysis based on an historical summary. 
 







War places two sides in violent opposition. Barring the successful settlement of conflict 
by diplomacy, the outcome of war will produce a winner and a loser. When evaluating an 
historical event, careful analysis of the options each side have at a given point in time 
may reveal some of the decision making processes that influenced the event’s outcome. 




In June of 1941 Germany launched Operation Barbaross  against the Soviet Union. The 
front reached from the Baltic States in the north to the Black Sea in the south. Despite 
rapid advances by the Germans using Blitzkrieg tactics, the September push into the 
Soviet motherland had been reduced to a war of attrition and not the war of annihilation 
Hitler had expected. The Germans had under estimated the level of Soviet preparation 
and the economic resiliency.1 Within sight of Moscow, the German Army with already 
extended supply lines met by another adversary, the oncoming winter. Stalin comments 
in early November, “the winter promises [the enemy] nothing good.” Soviet leadership 
clearly understood the strategic advantages of winter warfare.2 The Soviet defeat of the 
Germans at Moscow though aided by the harsh winter conditions, was primarily the 
result of the larger number of Soviet forces and a tremendous civilian effort directed at 
improving fortifications.3 Operation Barbarossa ended with the German retreat from 
Moscow in the spring of 1941. 
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In early April of 1942, Hitler re-directed the German efforts to the agricultural, coal, and 
oil producing regions of southern Russia. The push would give Germany needed 
resources and separate the Soviet forces, in Moscow and further north in Leningrad, from 
critical resources. Stalin’s intelligence sources noted the build-up and repositioning of the 
German forces and responded by moving troops and armaments south along the Don 
River.4 The German advance on the south had by mid-July, captured the region along the 
Don R. that produced 60 per cent of Soviet Union’s coal supply. The German push south 
continued toward the North Caucasus and the Caspian oil fields. To protect their eastern 
flank, the Germans sent forces to seize the city of Stalingrad, a key manufacturing center 
and the major regional port on the Volga River.5  
 
The Soviet forces had taken horrific losses during the German offensive but Zhukov saw 
opportunity in fighting the Germans at Stalingrad. The local Communist Party recruited 
thousands of citizens to dig fortifications as the Muscovites had done a year earlier. 
Bitterly fought battles marked the German advance on Stalingrad. On August 23, the 
German Luftwaffe reduced the city to ruin, the next day German forces tried to seize the 
city’s tank production facility at the converted tractor factory.  Armed factory workers 
joined Soviet soldiers to drive off the Germans.6 Hitler responded by ordering General 
Paulus to take Stalingrad, more German resources were directed towards the effort. By 
early November, the well-trained Germans troops under Paulus had pushed the Soviet 
defenders out of the ruined city and onto the bank of the Volga R. Strong artillery support 
from across the river bought time for the Soviets as the German press continued.7 But 
excessive German dependence on poorly equipped and trai ed Italian, Hungarian, and 
Romanian troops posted to the northern and southern flanks put Paulus’s troops in a 
vulnerable position.8  
 
On November 19, the Soviet Operation Uranus, also known as Zhukov’s Trap9, attacked 
the weakly defended German flanks in a pincer move. On February 2, 1943, Paulus and 
90,000 trapped German troops surrendered in Stalingrad.10  The course of the war on the 
Soviet Western Front had changed; the German Army began a long series of retreating 
battles that ended in Berlin in May 8, 1945 with Marshal Zhukov witnessing the signing 
of the German surrender to the Soviet Union.11 
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The point in time picked for an analysis of this conflict is early November 1942. Despite 
the enormous scale of the Soviet-German war front, both Stalin and Hitler focused 
tremendous human and material resources to the conflict i  Stalingrad. The Germans 
were in a less favorable position because of the long supply lines they had to maintain 
and the prospect of another winter deep in Soviet territory. The Soviets, in contrast not 
only gained advantage through the diminished German situation, but had since April, 
been moving armaments, supplies, and troops to the east banks of the Volga in 
preparation of springing “Zhukov’s Trap.” The Germans were further hampered by poor 
intelligence estimates of the Soviet strength and will to fight.12 Both sides had more than 
one million men and nearly 10,000 artillery guns and mortars. With 675 tank and assault 
vehicles, the Soviets had a slight advantage over the Germans.13 Perhaps the most 
significant factor in determining the options available to both sides were that both Hitler 
and Stalin had issued fight at all cost orders. Hitler’s Directive No. 41 that authorized the 
German push towards southern Russia contained “stand fast” orders that eliminated 
retreat as a possible option.14 Stalin responded with his similar ‘Not One Step 
Backwards’ order (No. 227) in late July.15 
 
Conflict Analysis  
 
The players are the Soviets (USSR) and Germany. The options for both sides are limited 
by non-feasible outcomes due to the win or loose nature of this war and the conditions 
imposed by the autocratic leadership of Hitler and Stalin. Options such as “retreat” or 
“surrender” do not exist in this conflict. The Soviets can hold their position or attack the 
Germans. The Germans can either continue the siege with current intensity or call in 
support to intensify the siege.  
 
The most preferential Soviet outcome would be that t ey attack while the Germans 
continue the siege at the current intensity. The second most preferred Soviet outcome 
would be that they hold their position while the Germans continue their siege at the 
current intensity. For the Soviets, either holding position or attacking while the Germans 
call in support, are less preferred but still acceptable due to the oncoming adequate 
supplies, superior intelligence capacity, and the approaching winter. 
 
The German’s most preferred outcome is that they call in support while the Soviets hold 
position. Next in the German preference, order would be that they call in support while 
the Soviets attack. Less preferential to the Germans are that they continue the siege at the 
current intensity level and the Soviets either hold their position or attack. 
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The Soviets are in the stronger position. German misperceptions of Soviet troop strength 
and the Soviet willingness to follow Stalin’s ‘Not One Step Backwards’ order resulted in 
too few troops and supplies to counter “Zhukov’s Trap.” Many of the German 
misperceptions were based on Hitler’s “micro-management” of the push to obtain the 






 Option Outcomes17 
 USSR 
 Hold Position 1   0   1   0 
 Attack 0   1   0   1 
 
 Germany 
 Continue Siege 1   1  0   0 
 Call in Support 0   0   1   1 
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Soviet Preference Vectors: 
    
 Soviet Options    
 Hold Position 0   1   1  0      
 Attack 1   0   0   1 
   
 German Options 
 Continue Siege 1   0   0   1   
 Call in Support 0   0   1   1 
   
 Ordinal Ranking 4   3   2   1   
 Decimal Form 6   5   9   1 
 
German Preference Vectors: 
 
Soviet Options 
Hold Positions 1   0   1   0 
Attack 0   1   0   1 
 
German Options 
Continue Siege 0   0   1   1 
Call in Support 1   1   0   0   
 
Ordinal Ranking 4 3 2 1  





Overall Stability x E E x 
 
USSR 
Player Stability r s s u 
Preference Vector 6 5 9 10 
UIs  6 6 6 
   5 5 
    9 
 
Germany 
Player Stability r s s u 
Preference Vector 9 10 5 6  
UIs  9 9 9 
   10 10 









The stable states for the Soviets are outcomes 5 and 9; the German stable states are 10 
and 5. Equilibiria exists at outcomes 5 and 9 since both outcomes are stable to both sides 
in the Stalingrad conflict.  
 
The conflict analysis suggests that conflict could be reduced if the Soviets hold their 
position and the Germans continue their siege at the current level, or if the Soviets hold, 
their position and the Germans call in support. Neither outcome actually happened. 
 
More advanced conflict analysis methods may generate his orically correct findings but 
conflict analysis methods as explained by Fraser and Hiple may be best suited to settling 
disputes rather than war. Dispute settlement is based on the sides or players moderating 
behavior to reach a desired outcome. War, as practiced at Stalingrad, can only be won or 
lost. The situation that amounts to a kill or be killed condition removes any value of the 




The conflict at Stalingrad ended with the Soviet victory. The tremendous expenditure by 
both sides in human and material resources indicates the importance both the Germans 
and Soviets placed on achieving victory. War is fought not only at the battlefront but also 
on the home front. Boin et al in the Politics of Crisis Management list five critical tasks 
that address political dimensions of crisis. The lin ar progression of crises within the 
political framework is described: sense making, decision making, meaning making 
terminating, and learning.19 Not just the armies of states are involved in war, the public 
also plays a role in such struggles.   
 
Both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union were autocraic egimes. Hitler and Stalin 
carefully controlled and shaped the release of information their citizens received from 
Stalingrad. Meaning making through tight media contr l was needed to maintain public 
support for the continuing war efforts. Casting the situation “in such a way that their 
efforts to manage it are enhanced” is far easier in the absence of democratic processes.20 
Media in autocracies can manipulate the truth and blend it with political needs to alter the 
public sense of reality. 
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 The German’s propaganda effort during the early stages of the Stalingrad conflict 
stressed the tremendous pace of advance and the hig level of Soviet causalities. Even 
before the Soviet offensive, reports of the high casualty rate among German troops were 
leaking from the front back to Germany. When the pace of advance slowed, the German 
propagandists took a more cautious approach so as nt to encourage the idea that the war 
did not require a degree of sacrifice.21 The efforts of the propaganda campaign were 
shifted to trying to blunt the reports of the dismal conditions being experienced by the 
troops at Stalingrad.22 When the Soviet offensive occurred, Hitler ordered all public 
information from Stalingrad stopped though this did not alter the public perception that 
Germany had been defeated. The German public’s view of Hitler’s effectiveness as a 
military leader suffered from the defeat. 23  
 
While the German propaganda delivery was reduced by their defeat at Stalingrad, the 
Soviets increased their propaganda efforts. The Soviet propaganda was directed mainly 
towards waging psychological war on the German public with radio broadcasts and 
falsified letters from prisoners of war. The Soviet propaganda further undermined Hitler’s 
propaganda program. 
 
Crisis Analysis as described by Fraser and Hiple, and crisis management as described by 
Boin et al., provided a good framework to carefully examine the Stalingrad conflict but 
neither can accurately account for the extreme factors that define war. The Cold War 
analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis is based on the premise that neither side will take an 
overly aggressive action because of the potentially devastating effect of nuclear war. 
Stalingrad was a different situation; the destruction of the other side is the desired 
outcome for both sides.  
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